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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court by
Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD)
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to said third degree felony
to allow the Appellant to challenge the Court's denial of Appellant's Motion to
Suppress.
1. The Kane County Deputy Sheriff, Dan Watson, without the reasonable
suspicion or requisite probable cause, unlawfully seized, detained, and searched the
Defendant's vehicle, after his initial reasons for the stop (speeding) had been
concluded or abandoned. Apparently, Deputy Watson never started to write a
citation for speeding. Preservedfor appeal at (R. 74-75).
Conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State v.
Thurman 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). State v, Brown, 852 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992).
Supporting authorities are: State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), and Terry v
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d (1968).
2. When Deputy Watson, operating alone, left his truck radio unattended, and
removed his dog from the truck, he purposefully stopped forward progress on the
stated reason and purpose for the initial stop, thereby abandoning same. According
to Deputy Watson, he performed the same ritual on three fourths (3/4) of the
dozen, or so, stops he made daily in his capacity as patrol deputy. The Deputy had
absolutely no grounds for suspicion of anything, other than speeding, when he
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started his search of Appellant's pickup. Preservedfor appeal at (R. 156 p. 6711.
19-22).
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman, supra. Supporting
authorities are: State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), State v. Mendoza,
748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987), and United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 83
L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).
3. Without probable cause, without a search warrant, without any factors being
present to constitute any recognized exception to the warrant requirement, Deputy
Watson failed to ask for, or obtain, consent of any of the occupants of Appellant's
truck prior to searching the same. Preserved for appeal at (R. 71).
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman, supra. Supporting
authorities are: State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989). State v Mendoza,
748 P.2d 181,183 (Utah 1987), and United States v Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 83 L.
Ed 2d 604 (1985).
4. The Deputy's stated reason for taking his Narcotics Detector Dog, Rudy, to the
driver's door of the Appellant's pickup, while the Appellant, his two adult
passengers, and the infant child, were still seated inside, was to announce his
intention to walk his dog around the truck and to inform the occupants of the truck
not to dismount the vehicle. This action amounted to "seizing" the truck and it's
occupants for his non-consensual investigative purposes. Preservedfor appeal at
(R. 156 p. 115). Deputy Watson had no articulable, reasonable, suspicion or
probable cause, and he did not ask for consent or receive valid, voluntary,
2

permission to do a search of the vehicle, nor did he request or obtain a warrant at
any time during the stop, or the subsequent trip to the Kane County Sheriffs Office,
where the bed of the truck was completely dismantled. The Deputy had not
arrested anyone when he first searched the pickup and found the physical evidence.
Preservedfor appeal at (R. 9) Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.
Thurman, supra. Supporting authorities are: State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132
(Utah 1989). State v Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,183 (Utah 1987), and United States v
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 83 L. Ed 2d 604 (1985).
5. Damaris Juarez, the Appellant's adult daughter, told Deputy Watson that the
Appellant did not speak English when the Deputy first asked to see their papers.
Deputy Watson did not speak Spanish. There is circumstantial evidence, and
direct testimony, that supports the Appellant's contention that the confessions were
obtained through coercive police interrogation techniques, and language designed
to manipulate, dominate, and nullify Defendant's free and unconstrained choice.
Deputy Watson threatened to incarcerate Defendant Juarez's daughter when there
was absolutely no evidence that she possessed any knowledge of the marijuana.
He threatened to remove Defendant's infant grandchild to foster care. Deputy
Watson's threats, combined with the act of actually removing the infant from the
mother, coerced Defendant Juarez to make a confession, when he had adamantly
denied any knowledge, or involvement, in criminal activity prior to that time.
The State has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
statements, admissions, and/or confessions, made by Appellant, were obtained in
3

accordance with principles espoused in Miranda, and that the Appellant
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. There is
circumstantial evidence, and direct testimony, that indicates the confession was
obtained through coercion and Appellant's ignorance of his fundamental rights.
The Appellant could not speak or understand English. The translation by Trooper
Davis, as the interpreter, is problematic. During his interrogation, Appellant raised
a question regarding the purpose of a lawyer; after that, no officer told Appellant
that he had the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present
during questioning. The State has produced no evidence, other that the statement
of the interrogating officers, that Appellant understood and waived the rights
afforded him under Miranda, the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, and the Constitution of the State of Utah. In spite of the fact
that they had recording equipment available to them at all times, it was never used
until the defendant started telling them what they wanted to hear. Preservedfor
appeal at (R. 67). Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman,
supra. Supporting authorities are: State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989).
State v Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,183 (Utah 1987) and United States v Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 83 L. Ed 2d 604 (1985).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of Judgment and Sentence for one count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, Marijuana, a Third
4

Degree Felony. This conviction is based upon Appellant's conditional plea of
guilty to said charge to enable him to appeal the Trial Court's denial of his motion
to suppress.
At the suppression hearing, counsel for the parties stipulated that the transcript
of the preliminary hearing should be made a part of the record and considered by
the Court as evidence on the suppression issues. The Court accepted the
stipulation. (R. 130, p. 11) (R. 158, p. 4).
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The controlling statutes and constitutional provisions are found in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 20,1996, approximately 8:00 P.M., DEPUTY, DANIEL LEWIS
WATSON, at that time a patrol deputy for the Kane County, Utah, Sheriffs
Office, traveling eastbound, activated his forward radar gun and stopped a pickup
truck westbound on highway 89, about milepost 62, for driving 68 mph, thereby
exceeding the posted speed limit of 55 mph. Defendant, MANUEL DOMINGUEZ
JUAREZ, was driving, ANGEL DOMINGUEZ RASCON, was a passenger, and
Defendant Juarez's eighteen year old daughter, DAMARIS JUAREZ, and her two
year old child, also occupied the single seat vehicle. (R. 156 p. 12-15) (R. 158, p.
13,11. 3-25, p. 14,11. 1-8). The Defendant driver and his male passenger, could not
speak or understand English. The Defendant's daughter was the only person at the
initial stop who was bilingual. The Defendant's daughter was pressed in to service,
5

at times, as the language interpreter during the initial stop. (R. 156 p. 15 L 9-15)
(R. 158, p. 20,11. 19-24). Deputy Watson obtained the license of the driver and the
registration for the vehicle (R. 156 p. 1611. 11-24) (R. 158, p. 14,11. 9-16) and
demanded identification from the Defendant's daughter and his passenger, Mr.
Rascon. (R. 156 p. 1611. 11-17). When the Defendant's daughter asked why he
needed her identification Deputy Watson stated, if she was going translate /
interpret for him, he needed to know who he was doing business with. (R. 156 p.
1611. 11-15) Deputy Watson's examination of the identification papers found them
satisfactory, but then, returned to his radio-equipped vehicle to run a check with his
radio dispatcher. Instead of remaining on purpose by completing his
communication with the dispatcher, (R.156 p. 1611. 21-24) Deputy Watson,
without any reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, (R. 156 p. 1711.
9-12), elected to take his dog, RUDY, (R. 156 1711. 12-25, p. 1811. 1-19), a
certified Narcotics Detector Dog, from the patrol truck he was driving. (R. 156 p.
1611. 21-24). He testified that he had no particular reason to take the dog from the
vehicle at that time. (R. 156 p. 1711. 9-12). He then took the dog to the driver's
side door of the Defendant's vehicle. (R. 156 p. 1711. 13-15,11. 19-24) (R 158 p. 60
11. 19). Deputy Watson did not ask permission to search the vehicle or for
permission to have the dog check the vehicle. (R. 156 p. 171. 25, p 1811. 1-6) {R
158 p. 6011.21-22). Standing at the driver's door with the dog, Deputy Watson
instructed the occupants to remain in the vehicle and to roll up their windows and
turn their vent on high, (emphasis added) (R. 158 p. 6011. 23-24).
6

Q. What happened next?
A. I started on the driver's front side by the bumper and I gave Rudy her
search command and walked her around along the driver's side of the vehicle to the
tailgate and along the back of the tailgate."(R. 156 p. 1811. 7 - 11) (R 158 p.6011.
25, p. 61,11. 1-3) (emphasis added)
According to Deputy Watson, the dog indicated reactions only on the seam
of the right side [passengers side] of the tailgate, of the pickup bed. (R. 156 p. 18
11. 20-24) (R. 158 p. 6111. 3-5).
Q. "... what is Rudy's reaction when she indicates on something?
A. Rudy is an aggressive indicator. She will scratch, bite, or bark at the - at the source of the odor that she detects." (emphasis added) (R. 156 p. 1811. 1519).
We have two different scenarios from Deputy Watson's testimony about
how, and when, he caged the Narcotics Detector Dog, Rudy, following the dog's
reaction on therightrear seam of the tailgate of the Defendant's pickup. First
Deputy Watson states he returned the dog to the security of his police vehicle
before going to the Defendant and asking him to step out of his truck. (R. 156 p. 19
11. 3-10). During cross examination, in response to a question as to whether or not
the Narcotics Detector Dog, Rudy, had ever been up in the bed of the Defendant's
pickup truck, Deputy Watson responds that the Detector Dog jumped into the bed
of the defendant's pickup, when the Defendant dropped the tailgate, during an
7

interrogation of the Defendant at the back of the pickup. Deputy Watson also
states that the dog gave no indication of the presence of narcotics while the dog
was in the bed of the pickup. (R. 156 p. 5211. 21-25, p. 53 11. 1-15).

Following the stated indication at the seam of the tailgate, in English,
Deputy Watson asked the driver, who could not speak or understand English, to get
out of the vehicle,(R. 158 p.61,11. 6 - 7 ) and took him out of earshot of the
daughter who could speak and understand English (R. 156 p. 19 11. 9-25). Deputy
Watson asked the defendant why the dog was indicating on his truck. In response,
according to the Deputy, he received a blank stare that caused him to realize that
the Defendant truly did not speak English (R. 156 p. 1911. 25, p.2011. 1-2).
Attempting to obey Deputy Watson's demanding demeanor, the Defendant opened
the tailgate and pulled a suitcase to the back of the tailgate. (R. 156 p. 2011. 48).(R 158 p. 57,11. 19 - 23). It was at that time, Deputy Watson claims that he
noticed that double stick tape was used to hold the bed-liner to the bed of the
pickup and the left rear corner of the driver's side of the bed-liner had separated
from the tape (R. 156 p. 2011. 15-24) approximately one-half inch to one inch. (R.
9 para 411. 3). Without asking the Defendant's consent (R. 156 p. 20 11. 25, p. 21
11. 1-2), the Deputy pulled that left-hand corner end of the liner, at the rear of the
vehicle, further away from the pickup bed, after engaging a flashlight which,
enabled him to see into the space between the liner and the pickup. (R. 156 p.2111.
3-13 p. 23,11. 1-5). Although it was still daylight at this time, apparently, the
8

Deputy needed a flashlight to see down the side of the truck between the bed-liner
and the pickup bed, where he observed packages which, appeared to be wrapped in
tape and stowed forward three to four feet (R. 156 p.21,11. 17-22 p. 10111. 5-13)
toward the cab of the truck. (R. 156 p. 2111. 20-22). According to Deputy Watson,
who says he speaks very little Spanish, (R. 156 p. 23 11. 13-14) he had the
Defendant, who was still unaccompanied by an interpreter, (R. 156 p. 23 11. 10-12),
look inside the bed-liner at the packages and, at that time, the defendant threw up
his hands and stated, in broken English, what sounded to Deputy Watson like (R.
156 p. 23,11. 19-20), "It's not my truck." (R. 156 p. 23 11. 8-21). The Deputy then
called for backup, examined the liner on the passenger side and observed similar
types of packages. (R. 156 p. 23 11. 23-25 p.2411. 1-9). Trooper John Davis, who
spoke Spanish, arrived at the scene and placed Defendant Juarez in the back of his
vehicle and both officers removed Mr. Rascon from the passenger side of the
vehicle and handcuffed him. (R. 156 p. 24 11. 10B25 p. 25 11. 1-2) They then
removed Ms. Juarez and infant from the vehicle, handcuffed her, and placed her
under arrest. (R. 156 p. 25 11. 3-12). Chief Deputy Allen Johnson also arrived at the
scene and all the three adults, the baby and the truck were taken to the Kane
County jail. (R. 156 p. 25 11. 13-25 p. 26 11. 1-17). In the jail parking lot, the bedliner was removed exposing 31 packages weighing a total of 67.31 pounds that a
later analysis determined to contain marijuana. (R. 156 p. 2811. 10-14, p. 4711. 425, p. 48, p. 4911. 1-21).
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At the Sheriffs Office, each of the suspects were interviewed separately on
at least two different occasions in the presence of the three officers; Deputy
Watson, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, John Davis and Kane County Sheriffs
Chief Deputy, Allen Johnson. (R.156 p. 2911. 16-19). Trooper Davis, who admits
his Spanish fluency is less that one hundred percent, (R. 156 p.7611. 3-6),
translated during the interrogation of the Spanish-speaking suspects. (R. 156 p. 33,
36 p. 7611. 12-17) The Appellant, and each of his passengers, was first given the
Miranda warning after Trooper Davis arrived at the scene of the stop. (R. 156 p. 24
11. 11-25, p. 25 11. 1-2). They were given a second Miranda warning at the Sheriffs
Office and denied any knowledge of the existence of any drugs. (R. 156 p. 30, p.
3111. 1-23, p. 32, 36). After the completion of the first set of interrogations, a reinterview of each of the parties began and the question and answer process was
repeated. (R. 156 pp. 37, 41, 44). Ms. Juarez again denied any knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the drugs. (R. 156 p. 3811. 21-24). During the second
interview of Mr. Juarez, the Appellant, continued to deny any knowledge regarding
the marijuana. Deputy Watson advised the Appellant that if Ms. Juarez were
arrested, her baby, his grandchild, would be taken from her and would be placed
in foster care. (R. 156 p. 6111. 25, p. 6211. 1-3 p. 86-87, p. 9711. 14-25 p. 9811. 118,112-113). Deputy Watson then left the interrogation room, accosted Ms.
Juarez, telling her, that because of her father's refusal to cooperate, her baby would
be taken from her and placed with a foster family and she would be booked,
arrested and held. Then and there, her baby was taken from her by Deputy Watson
10

and carried to the open door of the interrogation room (R. 156 p. 6211. 16-25 p. 63
11. 1-6) and then past the open door of the interrogation room (R. 156 p. 6211. 1625 p. 63 11. 6) to the dispatching area. (R. 156 p. 41 11. 21-25 P 421. 1). Deputy
Watson then returned to the interview room without the Appellant's grandchild.
Trooper Davis advised Deputy Watson that Defendant Juarez had now agreed to
take the blame. (R. 156 p. 4211. 2-8). The Appellant then, in a question and answer
interrogation by Trooper Davis in Trooper Davis' Spanish, acknowledged
involvement in transporting the Marijuana and this statement was recorded. (R.
156 pp. 40,42-44, 63 11. 2-6, pp. 86-88,100, 101, p. 3211. 22-25 p. 33 11. 1). No
other conversations were recorded that evening, not the Miranda warnings and not
even the first part of the Appellant's conversation when he confessed. From the
testimony of Deputy Johnson as to the position of the Appellant in the
interrogation room, the Appellant could have observed Deputy Watson with the
child after the removal of the child from the mother. (R. 156 p. 11411. 2-7). During
the second interview of Mr. Juarez, he asked the interrogating Officers what was
the purpose of a lawyer. (R. 156 p. 10111. 14-18, 22-24). Trooper Davis testified he
told Mr. Juarez, (R. 156 p. 102 11. 7-10) " . . . lawyers legal counsel explain to you
your rights, what the laws are, and what basically what you need, can and can't do,
need to do, as far as the whole situation goes." (R. 156 p. 102 L. 4-10). After that,
Trooper Davis states, it was quiet for a little while, as Deputy Watson was out of
the room on his errand andfinally,according to Trooper Davis, the Defendant said
Listen, I'll go and come clean with you. Or according to Trooper Davis, "Okay. I'll
n

take the blame for it." (R. 156 p.9911. 24-25 p. 100,11. 1-5).
Soon thereafter, Damaris Juarez and her baby were releasedfromjail and
she was not booked, nor was she charged with any crime. (R. 110 para 28 and 31)
(R. 157 p 8 11. 5-7)(R. 158, p. 6911. 18 - 22)
Q. " I trust that you or someone made a decision not to file charges
against Mz. Juarez, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Who made that decision, and why?
A. I did, based on the fact that urn, her father confirmed that she didn't
know anything about the packages." (R. 156 p. 3211. 4-9).
The recorded confession, (R. 156 p. 3911. 17-25, p. 40) was transcribed by
the prosecution and in the end notes of the official transcriber he complains about
the lack of the Troopers understanding of, certain Spanish verbs, subject pronouns,
and how the person asking the questions doesn't understand the rather basic
conjugation of the verb "poner". (R. 65 para 3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I: In this case, using the opportunity of a routine traffic violation to
initiate a search of Defendant's pickup with the aid of a drug dog, with absolutely
no prerequisite probable cause, as Deputy Watson does on seventy five percent of
the travelers that this officer contacts, (R. 156 p. 6711. 19-22) flies in the face of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of
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the State of Utah.
See Boydv. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633 (1886) as follows:
"For the unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and
compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself,' which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws
light on the question as to what is an unreasonable search and
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Also, see U.S. v. Vertigo-Arcades, 494 U. S. 159, 265 (1990).
Point II: Extending the time of a traffic stop to do a dog search of a vehicle
has been upheld in other jurisdictions, but, in those cases, they had, reasonable
articulable suspicion, or requisite probable cause or two officers, one working
the traffic stop and the second handling the dog. The two-man operation
satisfied the requirement, in those jurisdictions, of not extending the time
required for the primary reason for the stop. See State v Williams, 565 So.2d 714
(Fla. 3d DC A (1990). fn the instant case, we have only one officer; one without
reasonable articulable suspicion or the requisite probable cause; one who cannot
simultaneously be on the radio in his car and out searching a vehicle with an
aggressive dog while the vehicle is occupied by scared, non-English speaking
travelers; one officer, who cannot claim he is not artificially extending the time
of the stop.
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Point III. Deputy Watson had no factors constituting recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement when he initiated his search with the help
of his dog; he did not ask permission to search the Appellant's truck. Deputy
Watson stopped the Appellant's pickup for speeding and without any reasonable
suspicion of any other law violations or criminal conduct, he released his
Narcotics Detector Dog, approached the drivers side of Appellant's pickup,
advised the occupants that he was going to have his drug dog do a "drug
detection." He then started a "walk around" of Appellant's pickup; he gave his
dog the "search command" and at the rear of the pickup, the dog, Rudy, made a
"hit". That "hit" led the Deputy to tear apart the bed of the truck and the
subsequent discovery of marijuana between the bed-liner and the bed of the
Appellant's pickup truck. (R. 156 p.2111. 19-22).
The above actions of Deputy Watson constitute a search of the Appellant's
pickup truck without any probable cause whatsoever and without even a scintilla
of any indication that Appellant or his passengers had done anything illegal
except exceed the speed limit.
Without probable cause, or a search warrant, and no factor being present to
constitute any recognized exception to the warrant requirement, Deputy Watson
failed to ask for, or obtain, consent from any of the occupants of Appellant's
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truck prior to searching the same.
If the dog indicating on the right seam of the tailgate is probable cause, then a
warrant should have been obtained before tearing apart the vehicle on the
highway. The separation of the bed-liner from double-sided tape in the western
dry climate is no surprise. The movement of the rear end, left corner, of the bedliner, one-half to one inch, after the tape loses its adhesion, shouldn't arouse
surprise; it doesn't create exigent circumstances. Since that separated corner is
four feet away, on the opposite side of the truck from the only area hit on by the
dog, it is not probable cause.
Said search was grossly unconstitutional.
POINT IV: Deputy Watson had no articulable reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, and he did not ask for consent or receive valid voluntary
permission to do a search of the vehicle, nor did he request or obtain a warrant at
any time during the stop or the subsequent trip to the Kane county sheriffs office
where the bed of the truck was completely dismantled.
Deputy Watson had not arrested anyone at the time he physically pulled the
left rear end of the bed-liner aside, as far as he could get it to move, and even in
daylight, he still needed aflashlightto see the packages, three to four feet
toward thefrontof the truck bed, between the liner and the side wall of the
pickup. His stated probable cause was that his Narcotics Detector Dog had
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indicated on the tailgate seam on the opposite side of the truck.
Point V. When an Officer of the law, who speaks no Spanish, questions a
person who speaks no English, then acts on a perceived response to that
interrogation, he occupies very thin ice if he testifies that the stringent
requirements of Miranda have been met. One could wonder if the Appellant
would have gotten a better answer if he had asked the purpose of a bathroom
than he received when he asked the purpose of a lawyer. The explanation he did
receive in response to his inquiry, as to the purpose of a lawyer, is a more
accurate description of a judge, hi the instance, it was incumbent upon the
Trooper to speak the words, in the best Spanish he could muster, "do you want
an attorney present?" That did not happen. There is no indication in the record
that Appellant ever waived his Miranda rights.
Further, there is clear evidence in the record that, before Appellant confessed,
Deputy Watson threatened to have Appellant's daughter arrested and to have his
infant grandchild placed in foster care.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
POINT I. THE MINOR VIOLATION BY THE DEFENDANT OF A
TRAFFIC RULE DID NOT PROVIDE REASONABLE SUSPICION
OR PROBABLE CAUSE TO ALLOW DEPUTY WATSON TO
LOOSE HIS NARCOTICS DETECTOR DOG AND SEARCH THE
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DEFENDANT'S TRUCK.
That this was a search of Appellant's vehicle by Deputy Watson with the
assistance of his dog, Rudy, is clearfromthe testimony of Deputy Watson.
The following portions of his testimony from the transcript make it clear
as to when the Deputy seized the Appellant's vehicle and its occupants and when
the search of said vehicle began.
After Deputy Watson's initial contact with the occupants of Appellant's
pickup truck, where Deputy Watson had found nothing unusual or out of order
(R. 156 p. 14II. 25-p. 17), he returned to his vehicle, called dispatch and took his
drug detection dog from his patrol vehicle (R.156 p. 16II. 20-24).
The following then occurred:
Q

Did you command her (dog) to do anything? (Parentheses added)

A

Yes, I did.

Q

I gave her~well, first I went up to the window and explained to
them what I was gonna do, that I was gonna walk my dog around
their truck.

Q

Which side of the vehicle did you approach to make that
explanation?

A

The driver's side.

Q

And did you, in fact, inform the occupants of the vehicle that you
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intended to have Rudy, do a drug detection, for lack of a better word?
A

Correct. I just - 1 explained to everybody just to sit tight. I was

gonna walk my dog around their car. (emphasis added) That way they don't ~
so people that are nervous about dogs, I don't want them to try to get out or
anything.
Q

What happened next?

A

I started on the driver's front side by the bumper and I gave Rudy

her search command and walked her around along the driver's side of the
vehicle to the tailgate and along the back of the tailgate, (emphasis added)
Q

There's a term that we use often, regarding Rudy, "indicate". Did

Rudy indicate on this vehicle?
A

Yes, she did.

Q

In this situation or in situations generally, what is Rudy's reaction

when she indicates on something?
A

Rudy is an aggressive indicator. She will scratch, bite, or bark at

the —at the source of the odor that she detects, (emphasis added)
Q

Where did Rudy indicate on this vehicle?

A

She indicated on the seam of the tailgate on the right side, the

passengers' side of the tailgate, (emphasis added)
Q

Anywhere else?
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A

No. (R. 156p.l7Il. 16-p.l8)

Deputy Watson seized the pickup and its occupants when he told " . . .
everybody just to sit tight." That he was just going to walk his dog around their
vehicle. At that point, the Deputy had nothing upon which base any suspicion of
any illegal activity by anyone.
He activated the search of Appellant's vehicle when he . . . gave Rudy her
search command and walked her around along the driver's side of the
vehicle. . . . "
A new wrinkle turns up in the suppression hearing, where, under cross
examination, Deputy Watson, at (R. 158, p. 60,11. 15-24), gives this story:
I stopped the truck and went to the driver. I then obtained their
identification. I then went back to my truck. I radioed in a request for a
drivers license check and a vehicle registration check. While I was waiting
for that to come back,, I got my dog out of the back of the truck. I went up
to the driver of the truck with the dog. I informed them I was gonna walk
the dog around the outside of the car. I asked them to stay in the truck. 1
asked them to roll up their windows and turn their vent on high, (emphasis
added)
By ordering the occupants of the vehicle to "roll up the windows and turn
the vent on high" this was a search of the inside odors of the pickup, and a search
of the odors of the occupants of the vehicle, under the pretext of an exterior search
by the Deputy, with the assistance of his dog. Deputy Watson elevated this stop to
a level two detention by effectively seizing the vehicle and the occupants therein.
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The act was tantamount to the opening of the car door. Quoting State v. James,
977 P.2d 489,1999 UT App 17, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah App. 01/28/1999)
[25] I. Legality of Opening the Door
[26] "Although a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car
than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth
Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d
1132, 1135 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted); see also New York v.
Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-15, 106 S. Ct. 960, 966 (1986) ("[A] car's interior
as a whole is .. . subject to Fourth Amendment protection from
unreasonable intrusions by the police."). Upon stopping a driver to
investigate a possible traffic violation, an officer may temporarily detain the
driver, passengers, and vehicle to examine the vehicle registration and
driver's license. See Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135. For protection, the officer
may also direct the driver to exit the vehicle. See id. If no arrest ensues,
the officer may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle only when
(l)probable cause supports it or (2) the officer is able to articulate
reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be dangerous. See id.
[27] It is well settled that a police officer's opening of a vehicle's
door constitutes a search. See Class, 475 U.S. at 115, 106 S. Ct. at 966
(holding that officer's opening of driver's side door to see vehicle
identification number was search under Fourth Amendment); Larocco, 794
P.2d at 466 (concluding that "constitutional privacy interest exists in
the interior of an automobile and that the opening of the car door by the
police officer here constituted a search"); Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1137
(stating that officer's "action of opening the car door constituted a
search, not an investigative detention, and therefore, the probable cause
standard was correctly applied by the trial court"); see also Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325,107 S. Ct. 1149, 1152-53 (1987) (stating that
even minor intrusion beyond legitimate scope of initially legal
investigation violates Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. O'Connor,
487 L.Ed.2d 238, 239-40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (suppressing evidence
from car stop because "officer had no right to open the car door"). We
must thus initially reject out of hand the State's rather cursory contention
that Trooper Kendrick's action was not a search, but part of his valid
investigative detention of James.
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All of that searching without a scrap of probable cause is, undoubtedly, what
the framers of the constitution had in mind when they wrote Article I, Section 14,
of the Utah Constitution.
The appellant does not dispute Deputy Watson's right to stop the truck in
question. However, the burden is on the State to show that a warrantless search
is lawful. See, State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah App. 1984).
"Again,... even if the circumstances are such that the police are excused from
the necessity of having a search warrant for an automobile, they are nevertheless
authorized to conduct a search of a vehicle for evidence only if they possess
probable cause that particular items of evidence are presently concealed therein."
(emphasis added) Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, Second Edition 1987,
section 5.2(c). The United States Supreme Court defines probable cause as facts
and circumstances within (the officers') knowledge sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is
being committed. See, Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
After a routine traffic stop, the detaining officer must be able to articulate a
particular and objective basis for their suspicions that is drawn from the totality
of the circumstances facing them at the time of the seizure. See, United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). The State bears the burden of
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establishing both probable cause and exigent circumstances in order for a
warrantless search to fall within the automobile exception to the requirements of
Art. I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See, State v. Larrocco, 19A P.2d
460, 470 (Utah 1990).
In State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), the court held that
troopers did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to
justify continued detention and questioning of defendants once warning citation
was given and purpose for initial stop had been accomplished. In Robinson,
Defendants appealed their conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance found while troopers were conducting a routine traffic stop. Officers
stopped the vehicle for improper passing. The officers made a routine check on
the driver's license and vehicle registration and found the vehicle was not
registered to either of the occupants. The defendants explained that their boss at
a floor covering business had allowed them to take the work van on a two-week
fishing trip to Wyoming. While checking out their story, the officers noted the
nervousness of the occupants and observed that a homemade bed, two feet high,
filled the back of the vehicle. Based on what they observed, the trooper
determined to ask consent to search the vehicle. Id., at 433. The Defendant,
Robinson, consented and the troopers observed five marijuana seeds in the rear
corner of the van. When the officers failed to get consent from Robinson to look
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under the bed, the officers stated that they would attempt to get a search warrant.
Officer Ogden then asked Robinson, "Since you won't let us take the plywood
panel off the van to look under the bed, would it be all right if we let a dog go
through the vehicle?" Robinson replied, "Yes," and asked if allowing the dog to
sniff meant giving consent to search. The Officer said "yes" and Robinson shook
his head affirmatively. The defendants were later arrested when the dog gave a
positive alert at the rear of the bed in the van and the trooper located eight duffel
bags of marijuana in the space under the bed. Id, at 434. The court concluded
that, in light of the troopers' questioning and conduct, the coercive atmosphere
at the time, and the other surrounding circumstances, the State had not borne its
burden to show that the search of the vehicle was lawful. They reached the same
conclusion about Robinson's subsequent consent to allow the narcotics dog to
search the van interior. Id, at 438.
From the foregoing case,, a number of conclusions analogous to the case
at a bar can be inferred: (1) that a "sniff by a trained narcotics dog does
constitute a "search"; (2) that a "search" conducted by a dog without particular
and articulable facts to sustain a warrantless search under the automobile
exception does require voluntary consent; and (3) that without consent or
particular and articulable facts establishing probable cause on the part of the
officer, such a "search" violates the fourth amendment of.the U.S. Constitution
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and Constitution of the State of Utah.
In the case at bar, Deputy Watson testified he stopped the vehicle in
question for exceeding the speed limit of 55 miles an hour. (R. 156 p. 12). After
stopping the vehicle, the driver produced a valid Arizona driver's license. (R.
156 p. 15). After he contacted his dispatcher for verification of the driver's
license and vehicle plates, he got a certified narcotics detector dogfromhis
police vehicle. (R. 156 p. 16-17). At that point, he had no particular reason to let
the dog out of his vehicle. (R. 156 p. 17). He explained that he was going to
walk the dog around the vehicle, but he did not obtain consent from any of the
occupants in the vehicle. (R. 156 p. 17). Because it was only after the dog
indicated a hit that the officer formulated articulable facts, which possibly gave
rise to probable cause sufficient to make a warrantless search of the vehicle, the
search was illegal under the automobile exception. (R. 156 p. 19-2 1). The
burden is on the State to show that evidence obtained following illegal police
conduct is attenuated from the illegality. See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
604 (1975). The State completely failed to make such a showing.
Since Deputy Watson lacked probable cause to conduct the non-consensual
search with the aid of his dog, the warrantless search of the vehicle that led to
the discovery of the illegal marijuana, violated Defendants" Fourth Amendment
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rights and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Additionally, the opening of the tailgate by Appellant could not have been a
voluntary consensual act since the Defendant could not understand the inquires
made by the Deputy, nor the consequences of compliance. Deputy Watson
knew Appellant Juarez could not speak nor understand English. (R. 156 p. 15,
19-20). Even knowing that, Deputy Watson removed Appellant from the vehicle
and out of earshot of the only person at the scene who could understand English,
or translate and continued to make inquiries of Appellant. In his attempt to
comply with his perception of the Deputy's inquiries, Appellant, not knowing he
could refuse, opened the tailgate and pulled out a suitcase that allowed Deputy
Watson to observe the opening between the bed and the bed-liner. Deputy
Watson then conducted a non-consensual and warrantless search that lead to the
discovery of the contraband. (R. 156 p. 20). Deputy Watson had neither consent
nor particular and articulable facts to support the warrantless search of the rear
of the vehicle, nor under the circumstances could he justify his warrantless
search under the plain view doctrine. Consequently, the warrantless search of the
vehicle by the Deputy with the aid of his dog and the resulting "fruits of the
poison tree" must be suppressed due to the non-consensual and coercive nature
and circumstances surrounding the initial stop.
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POINT II. DEPUTY WATSON UNLAWFULLY DETAINED THE
DEFENDANT BY FAILING TO COMPLETE THE PURPOSE OF HIS
INITIAL REASON FOR THE STOP AND INTERRUPTING THE FLOW
OF THAT TRANSACTION TO PURSUE A SEARCH WITH HIS DOG.
Extending the time of a traffic stop to do a dog assisted search of a vehicle
has been upheld in other jurisdictions, but, in those cases, they had either
reasonable, articulable suspicion, requisite probable cause or two officers, one
working the traffic stop and the second handling the dog. The two-man
operation satisfied the requirement in that jurisdiction of not extending the time
required for the primary reason for the stop. State v Williams, 565 So. 2d 714,
Fla. 3rd DCA (1990). The rule is otherwise in this jurisdiction.
In the instant case, we have only one officer; one without requisite,
reasonable, articulable suspicion; one who cannot simultaneously be on the radio
in his car and out searching a vehicle with an aggressive dog (R. 156 p. 18II. 1719) while the subject vehicle is occupied by three adults, and a baby only one of
which speaks English. In State V. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994), the
Utah Supreme Court held as follows:
* * *

To determine whether a search or seizure is constitutionally
reasonable, we make a dual inquiry: (1) was the police
officer's action "justified at its inception"? And (2) was the
resulting detention "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place"? Id. At 19-20.
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* * *

As to the first inquiry, a police officer is
constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is
"incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers'
presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P. 2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); see also State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 88183 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). An observed traffic violation gives
the officer "at the least, probable cause to believe the citizen
had committed a traffic offense." State v. Smith, 781 P.2d
498,500 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that "[w]hen an officer
observes a traffic offense—however minor— he has probable
cause to stop the driver of the vehicle"); State v. Cole, 674
P.2d 199,123 (Utah 1983). An observed violation, however,
is not required. Stopping a vehicle may also be justified
when the officer has "reasonable articulable suspicion that
the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving
under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license ..
. [or that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal
activity, such as transporting drugs." State v. Lopez, 831
P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see State v. Deitman,
793 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). In the words of the
United States Supreme Court, as long as an officer suspects
that the "driver is violating any one of the multitude of
applicable traffic and equipment regulations," the police
officer may legally stop the vehicle. Prouse, 440 U.S. at
661.
The second question is whether the stop was
reasonably related in scope to the traffic violation, which
justified it in the first place. Once a traffic stop is made, the
detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v.
Roger, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Both the "length and [the]
scope of the detention must be strictly tied to and justified
by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah
1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-21). This means that
an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a
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driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer
check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has
produced valid drivers' license and evidence of entitlement
to use the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his
way, without being subjected to further delay by police for
additional questioning."
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) quoting United
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512,1519 (10th Cir. 1988) held that investigative
questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable
suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Deputy Watson had no suspicion of
criminal activity (other than speeding) in the instant case. The Deputy legally
stopped the Defendant's vehicle; called dispatch, did not commence writing the
driver a citation for speeding, but rather initiated a search of Defendant's pickup
truck. During direct examination by the Kane County Attorney, Colin R.
Winchester at (R. 158, p. 53 11. 17 - 25, p. 5411. 1-10), Deputy Watson advises
that the response time for verification from his Dispatcher ranges from a
minimum of thirty seconds to as much as two minutes. At (R. 158, p. 53,11. 1 8), responding to Mr. Winchester's query of how soon after the stop Deputy
Watson got out his dog he states:... "I then took their drivers licenses back to
my truck, the time it would have taken to read their names into the radio,
because I ran records on the vehicle and on the drivers license. And then after I
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ran the records check over the radio, I got my dog out and went back to the car.
So it couldn't have been more than just a couple of minutes. Probably about
three or four. Four, I think."
In that same period of time he could havefinishedhis verification with the
dispatcher, if he hadn't already, and been partiallyfinishedwriting the citations
for speeding and no child seat. He states that, after bringing the Defendant to the
rear of the truck, and having a conversation with him, that he returned to his
patrol vehicle and the radio dispatcher advised him that the occupants of the
Juarez truck were not wanted by any authorities. (R. 158, p. 61,11. 5 - 13).
In State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the following facts were
at hand: The officer observed the driver doing 42 mph in a 35 mph zone, while
stopping the vehicle he observed the passenger of the pickup bending over,
actingfidgety,turning left to right, and turning back to look at the officer. Also,
when the stop was made, the driver met the officer between the two vehicles
and the passenger continued to move about in the cab causing the officer to
conclude that the passenger was trying to hide something. The officer then
approached the passenger door; tapped on the window, and immediately opened
the door, whereupon the officer saw marijuana and paraphernalia in the cab in
plain view. In that case {Schlosser, Id.), the Utah Supreme Court sustained the
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trial court's suppression of the evidence and, in doing so, wrote the following:

The state argues that the officer's opening the door constituted an
extension of an "investigative detention" and that the officer's
actions were lawful because defendants' activities gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion either of criminal activities or of danger to the
officer's personal safety. Therefore, the State asserts that the judge
erroneously applied a probable cause standard instead of a
reasonable and articulable suspicion standard in the hearing on the
motion to suppress. As stated above, Officer Howard's action of
opening the car door constituted a search, not an investigative
detention, and therefore, the probable cause standard was correctly
applied by the trial court. However, even if the State's premise
were accepted that no search occurred, the facts do not support a
reasonable and articulable suspicion standard in the hearing on the
motion to suppress. As stated above, Officer Howard's action of
opening the car door constituted a search, not an investigative
detention, and therefore, the probable cause standard was correctly
applied by the trial court. However, even if the State's premise
were accepted that no search occurred, the facts do not support a
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity which is
necessary to support the State's position. See State v. Dorsey,
(Citation omitted); State v. Carpena, (Citation omitted); State v
Swanagan, (Citation omitted).
An investigative detention is justified if a police officer has a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the automobile's occupants
are "involved in criminal activity." United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Dorsey, 731
P.2d at 1087, 1090. Additionally, an officer may search a vehicle
for weapons if he has a reasonable belief that the suspect is
dangerous and "may gain immediate control of weapons." Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d
1201 (1983). In such instances, "due weight must be given, not to
[the officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'
but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to
draw from the facts in light of his experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392
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U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868,1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Here, Officer Howard had no probable cause, and no articulable
suspicion either that his safety was in danger or that the occupants were
engaged in criminal activity. He cited no safety concerns as the basis for
his actions; he sought only to investigate the possibility that defendants
were engaged in illegal activity, and for that reason he opened the
passenger door. Here Deputy Watson, like officer Howard, had no
probable cause, and no articulable suspicion that his safety was in danger
or that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity. Unlike Officer
Howard, Deputy Watson didn't even have anyone acting fidgety or
nervous. Deputy Watson did have the fact that two (2) of the three (3)
adult occupants couldn't speak English, and that is all he had when he
gave his dog the command to search.
Deputy Watson has offered nothing in the way of suspicion to justify
his search of Appellant's vehicle, not even a hunch. The Deputy should
have issued Mr. Juarez a citation for speeding and sent him on his way.
POINT ffl. ABSENT VALID EXCEPTIONS TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT, DEPUTY WATSON FAILED TO
OBTAIN VALID VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO SEARCH THE
PICKUP TRUCK.
Analyzing this action as is reflected in the transcript (R. 156 P 12,11. 3-4,
19-20, 23-24, p. 13,11. 3-5), and Deputy Watson's report (R. 9) Watson sees the
truck coming toward him, turns his radar gun on, clocks the Appellant at 68 in at
55 mph zone, turns on him and pulls him over for a stop. So far so good.
Deputy Watson makes contact with the driver of the vehicle, requests papers of
not only the driver but all the occupants of the vehicle and finds them in good
order. (R.156 p. 14,11. 25, p.15,11. 21-23, p. 16,11. 11-17). Rather than writing
a ticket for speeding and sending the people on their way he decides to do a
radio check with his dispatcher. (R. 9, R. 156 p. 1611. 21-22) (R. 158 p. 60,11. 15
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-24). He has no suspicion of any criminal activity beyond the routine speeding
violation. (R. 9, R.156 p. 17,11. 9-12). At this point Deputy Watson had no
exceptions to the warrant requirement, he did not ask permission to search the
Defendant's truck and yet, he then started a search of appellants' truck (R. 156 p.
17,11. 13-25, p. 18,11. 1-11, p. 20,11. 25, p. 21,11. 1-2). If the dog indicating on
the right seam of the tailgate, of the pickup truck, is probable cause, then Deputy
Watson should have been obtained a warrant before tearing apart the rear or the
Defendant's pickup truck on the highway (R. 9, R156 p. 21,11. 9-25). The
separation of the bed-liner from double-sided tape in the western climate is no
surprise. The movement of the rear end, left corner, of the bed-liner, one-half to
one inch, after the tape loses its adhesion, should not arouse suspicion (R. 9, para
4 R. 156 p. 20,11. 19-24); it doesn't create exigent circumstances.
Deputy Watson did not ask any of the occupants of Appellant's truck if he
could search the pickup and thus, obtained no consent. Appellant's actions in
reaching for the suitcase does not constitute consent to search because he could
not understand the language used by Deputy Watson.
In State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court stated,
at page 1257, the following:
* * *

Voluntariness is primarily a factual question, see Schneckloth v.
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Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973), and the analysis used to
determine voluntariness is the same without regard to whether the
consent was obtained after illegal police conduct. If the court
determines that the consent was not voluntary, no further analysis is
required; the consent is invalid, and the proffered evidence must be
excluded. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050,
1056 (Utah 1987); State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah
1980).
In Arroyo, we said that "whether the requisite voluntariness
exists depends on" the totality of all the surrounding circumstances
— both the characteristics of the accused and the details of police
conduct." 796 P.2d at 689 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226);
accord State V.Robinson 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Our cases before Arroyo make clear that both the "characteristics of
the accused" and the "details of police conduct' must be considered
in determining whether a defendant's consent was actually a
product of his or her free will. See Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1056;
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106 n. 14. The prosecution bears the
burden of proving that the defendant's consent was voluntary. State
v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375,1377 (Utah 1986) (per curium);
(Citations omitted)
The second determination to be made in deciding whether a
consent following police illegality is valid is "whether the consent
was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality," Arroyo,
796 P.2d at 688; see also Sims, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. At 6; cf. Allen,
839 P.2d at 300, or in other words, "whether the 'taint' of the
Fourth amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit
introduction of the evidence," Harris, 495 U.S. at 19 (citing Crews,
445 U.S. at 471). The principle underlying the exploitation test is
that the Fourth Amendment should not permit law enforcement to
"ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after
the illegality has occurred." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689. Arroyo's
primary goal was to deter the police from engaging in illegal
conduct even though that conduct may be followed by a voluntary
consent to the subsequent search.
* * *

In the instant case, the prior illegality occurred when Deputy Watson
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seized the defendant's pickup and its occupants by ordering them to roll up the
windows and turn the vent blower on high and commenced his search of
Appellant's pickup truck (R. 156 p. 17-18II. 141) (R. 158, p. 60,11. 20 - 24).
Thereafter, he claims that appellant's actions (moving the suitcase) constituted
consent to search.
Clearly Appellant did not consent to the search of his truck and it cannot
be argued in good faith that a man who does not speak English being spoken to
in English, attempting to obey an officer, has voluntarily consented to the
search by his actions. Further, there was no attenuation between the police
illegality and the search of the bed of the pickup by the Deputy.
POINT IV. THE SEARCH OF THE PICKUP BED WAS NOT
JUSTIFIED BY "PROBABLE CAUSE" OR "INCIDENT TO ARREST"
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES AND/OR THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Deputy Watson had not arrested anyone at the time he physically pulled the
left rear end of the bed-liner aside, as far as he could get it to move. At that time
and in daylight, he still needed a flashlight to see the packages, three to four feet
toward thefrontof the truck bed, between the liner and the side wall of the
pickup. His stated probable cause was that his Narcotics Detector Dog had
indicated on the tailgate seam on the opposite side of the truck. When the
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tailgate was opened and the dog jumped up onto the tailgate

>

the interior of the truck bed, the dog gave no indication of the presence of any
drugs., whatsoever Deputy Watson should have been satisfied, if he believed in
Ins ilog so sliongl}. lliat there was nothing forward 01 (he lailgate and stopped
'

r mquiiA in that poml

I h.il should hi. .- i.„gau:c any perceived

pi yjuauic cause. It was after I Ins poml thai In sn\v lltr lell

lewall ol I IK IK A

liner separated from the double-sided tape, 2 to I mi li liom <h«- WW ^ide^all of
the pickup bed. It was his search of the left sidewali ihat first revealed what
turned out to be marijuana.
Further, no exigent circumstances existed.

•art of Appeals points oul the nivii toi evident riicuinslaiu.es as lollop ,
* * *

"™ Slate has the burden of proving that "the exigencies of ihe
tination made [the search] imperative." Slate v Ashe, 745
!
258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Coolidge \. New I iampshire. 40 ;
. 443. 445 (1971)). One type of exigent circumstance identifier.
by the Supreme Court is when preservation H the evidence might
be endangered by the delay in obtaining a ^.«: . mt '' '••••• ierh: - %
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-'71 n<W>
* * *

Probable cause is not the onb < 'uirement oi lite "automobile P Y W
rule.
In State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme

Court clearly outlined the requirements of the "automobile exception" rule in
Utah, as follow:
* * *

. . . there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the
highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.
* * *

For this exception to apply, the police must have probable cause to
believe that the automobile contains either contraband or evidence
of a crime and that they may be lost if not immediately seized ...
* * *

In the instant case, both requirements are absent. The Deputy had no
probable cause. The truck was not going anywhere.
Probable cause consists of facts and circumstances within (the officers')
knowledge sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense has been or is being committed. The State bears the
burden of establishing both probable cause and exigent circumstances in order
for a warrantless search to fall within the automobile exception under Art. I
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, See, State v. Larrocco, 794 P.2d 460,470
(Utah 1990).
POINT V. ANY AND ALL ADMISSIONS DURING THE INITIAL
STOP OF THE VEHICLE AND CONFESSIONS BY DEFENDANT
WHILE IN CUSTODY WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
DEFENDANT'S MIRANDA RIGHTS AND THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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an Officer oi" the law, (Trooper 1 );ivis) w ho speaks puor Spanish,

questions a person who speaks no English, 'then acts on a perceived response to
that interrogation, he occupies very thin ice if he testifies that the stringent
ytiiieriients of Miranda have been met. One could wonder if the Defend;, nil
"i mill li.iu: jioltui ii lu/itei Jiisvvei il lit had asked llie purpose ol a i>athroom
man lie received when he ask llie i mi post »l ii liinvn

Nit expliinaiioii lit iim

receive in response to his inquiry, as lo the purpose eil* ;i Li\s \ n is i more
accurate description < Ta judge, hi that instance, it was incunuvm upuii die :"
v A llcers to speak Ihc w ords, in the best Spanish they" could muster, "Do you •
waul an allornev preiienl'1
* "^ \ v
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" ^ ; , ?-78 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Lndei the 1 ^
whether the confession was free and voluntai ) ;
Miii .M iiiK iUs or violence, not obtained by

any direct or imnlied r
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• *.,

improper influence/ Id, a t /. i iiC keystone lor do^mlining the admissibility of
any statements obtained through custodial interrogation is found in '. Uranda v.
Arizona, 384 U S 436 (1966) As a constitutional perquisite to any quesii^m

an individual held for interrogation by a law enforcement officer must be warned
in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent, any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Id, at 444-445.
The requirements of warning and waiver of rights is fundamental to the exercise
of the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing
methods of interrogation. Id., at 470. The determination of whether a defendant
was aware of his rights and effectively waived them are assessed (1) on the
background of the person being interrogated and (2) the circumstances
surrounding the custodial interrogation. A defendant may effectually waive
rights enumerated in the Miranda warning provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Id, at 444. Assessment of the
knowledge the defendant possesses is based on his age, education, intelligence,
and prior contact with authorities. Id, at 468-469. In determining whether a
defendant effectually waives the rights enumerated in the Miranda warning, the
State has the burden of proof to establish from the totality of the circumstances
that the consent was voluntary. See, State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah
1985). A confession of the accused must be the product or result of free and
unconstrained choice. See, State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1989). A
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confession cannot be exacted by tint r
influences, or promises, and still be deemed to »•
639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981). The State bears the burden ol'pim ni|.» In ,n
least a preponderance of the evidence, that the Appellant's confession is
.s..ar> ^ . . , ^ « .
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was at the jail, the Appellant contends, tb *
were obtained in violation of the principles espoused in Mirundc
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process rights, guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and the Consilium „,
MM.: Male of i ilah, as there is no evidence, in the record, that his admissions were
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was obtained through his ignorance of his hnuliiifiriil.i1 rHi 1 and induuil I • iK
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intimidating, restrictive, and coercive police investigative and interrogating
techniques. (R. p. 1911. 9-25, p. 2011. 1-2, p. 2011. 4-8, p 23 11. 10-12, p. 23,11.
19-20, p. 23 11. 8-21, p. 4111. 21-25, p. 42 1.1, p. 4211. 2-8, p. 5211. 21-25, p. 53
11. 1-15. p. 611. 25, p. 6211. 1-3 p. 86-87, p. 6211. 16-25, p. 63 11. 1-6, p. 9711.
14-25, p. 98 11. 1-18,112-113, p. 9911. 24-25, p. 100,11. 1-5, p. 10111. 14-18, 2224, p. 10211. 4-10, p 10211. 7-10, p. 11411. 2-7) (R. 110 para 28 and 31) (R. 157
p. 811. 5-7).
Trooper John Davis, in his Spanish, administered at the scene, and again
at the jail, the Miranda warning. (R. 156 p. 30-32, 36). The court approved
licensed interpreter critiqued the Spanish of the interrogating officer. (R. 65
para 3). When translating the taped confession from Spanish to English, in the
endnotes of the transcriber, Robert T. Behunin, 1202 W. 800 S., Cedar City, UT
84720, (801) 586-1457, remarking about the bad conjugation of the verb "poner"
stated: "the person asking the questions doesn't understand this rather basic verb
structure." (R. 65 para 3).
Thus, one could surmise from the pronunciation and the methods of combining
words from English to Spanish, that Appellant lacked comprehension of, and/or
any meaningful understanding of, the legal rights afforded within the Miranda
warning and the significance and consequences of voluntarily waiving the rights
contained therein. (R. 64 para 1). Paraphrasing and/or rendering of the language
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by Trooper Davis, in asking Ihe questions anil in, ailm:.1 ,is Ihe ni(n|ticlei, aikloi
,' \\i pellanf s lack o f u . u v . . « « j i n » of the context of the Fughsb language i i"
~"r: probable than nut. thai the Appdlan: Juarez did not understand the rights
athnviv\i iiiiiui^ut t.i'dtttia
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Woods, 868 P.2d 70, 86 (Utah 1993). After Miranda and duraig the in-custody
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u^alion of Appeiiaml Juarez, he asked the purpose of a lawyer before

making any admissions againsl interest. (1(. lM>p 101-102), hooper Davis
attempted lo explain 1o Ihe /\ppclLnil n l u l a l.nwn "i is hil .il nn lune did he
clarify 'that the Miranda warning allowed him to K*-v ^ the instant interrogation, and at no time did Trooper Davis su} ;; >u have uic
, i»t to remain silent" nor did the Trooper, at 'that time, obtain a waiver from the
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I.Individual held for interrogation must be
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lawyer with him during interrogatioi i Mii'if^U
effective and express exp;

tilC (iciCliUdi

" a lawver a«id to have the
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assurance that he is truly in the position to exercise it. Id, at 473. From
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Appellant Juarez question (R. 156 p. 10111. 14-18, 22-24) alone, one would
surmise that he did not understand his right to consult with an attorney and his
right to have an attorney present during questioning and, not the least of which,
the right to remain silent or the consequences of waiving that right to remain
silent.
Other than the estimation by the officers themselves that Appellant did waive
his rights, the State failed to produce any evidence that the statements,
admissions, and/or confessions made by the Appellant were made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently, or that the Appellant effectively waived his rights
under Miranda, or the due process clause, of the U.S. Constitution or
Constitution of the State of Utah. Therefore, any and all admissions and/or
confessions by the Appellant must be suppressed
Appellant was interrogated in the presence of three officers. Interrogation
tactics and techniques employed while questioning defendants, make it more
probable than not, that Appellant was coerced and intimidated into making
statements, admissions and/or confessions against his penal interests. In State v.
Ashdown, 296 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1956), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the
general rule stated in 20 Am.Jur. Evidence' 508 (1939), which states:
"[T]elling the accused that it would be better for him to
speak or tell the truth does not furnish an inducement, or
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sufficient inducement, to render objectionable j i MIMI'^'HHI
thereby obtained., unless threats or proim

.

(emphasis added)
it;

In this instant case, threats were used • =-.
97-98, 112-11?^
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62-86-87-

Intern^ ui n techniques utilized b\ notice may not be so (Mill ii|>eous ni'l
u»en ivc is in UMictunc Appellant • >»ii. <uiu induce him to talk when he
iillicrwise would not have done so. *w '
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I Utah 1986).
In State v i irijjin, 754 P.2d 965, 970 (Utah 1988), the following
examples ol coei ci vc interrogative language were held to be sufficient to
w;irr,ii>1 suppress

il iln usiiliniy confession:

Lijn order for you to e
again then you're going 10 neea .v-&u ^
after that time and only after that time *»
i
to be reunited with your daughter iv
receive any help for the problem.
* admit
there is a problem. Right \v.<:\ ', am >nK
v. vo» ^nn one.
But more charges are going io ii<ii«»\
It boils down to the fact urn I / v >\ and v*«u need some ;
and we can get you that help
Whether or not you admit u u> tin I m ^ouig to build a case ;_
\ oi i and I'm going to convict
hi the case at bar, the oft
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: . i.. v :.s ig unci ,-ogations to

induce statements, admissions, and/or conf.-s* »
following statements while iii.w. ^•>-"ti \t
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... the first part of the conversation I basically was
explaining to him the differences in his statement and
his daughter's statement and I couldn't understand why
he wasn't just... I mean he was caught... why he
didn't just come out and get this over with so his
daughter ... we could release his daughter and go
home. I explained to him that at that particular point I
wasn't able to release anyone; that everyone that was
gonna be charged at this particular time. (R. 156 p. 411
told him that his daughter was a suspect and that...
that I believed that he knew what was going on and he
could ... he would be the only one that could tell me
she wasn't involved. (R. 156 p. 61).
I told him that if she was arrested, the baby would have to be placed
into foster care until someone could come up and pick her up. (R.
156 p. 61-62)
In response to questioning by the County Attorney, Trooper Davis testified
as follows:
... Mr. Juarez realized that what deputy Watson wanted to do was
to arrange to have his daughter, Ms. Juarez, booked into jail and
have the baby placed in a foster home at the time. At that point he
decided to go ahead and cooperate and advise us of the ... of
what he was doing, as far as the transaction with the narcotics. (R.
156 p. 86)
In response to Mr. Scarth's question about the number of times in both
interviews any officer stated to Mr. Juarez something to the effect of: Come
clean. Tell us what's going on, Trooper Davis made the following replies:
Numerous times I'd say probably three of four times per
interview, so roughly up to about 10. Dan Watson did tell Mr.
Juarez that if he couldn't get to the bottom of it, his daughter
would have to be booked. (R. 156 p. 97)
Until Deputy Watson left the interrogation room to remove the child from
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its mother, Defendant J uarez had denied .ill know Ivdyv of 'he piesena 1 1 |(
j ;uird, (R. 156 p. 98, 113). li was only after Depill\ V\ atson removed the
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Constitution. See, State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), State v.
Larrocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990).
Deputy Watson conducted an illegal search of Appellant's vehicle and this
alone is ground for the Court to suppress all the evidence obtained by the
officers, including that found under the bed-liner of the defendant's pickup
truck.
The State has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
statements, admissions, and/or confessions, made by Appellant, were obtained in
accordance with principles espoused in Miranda, and that the Appellant
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. There is
circumstantial evidence and direct testimony that indicates the confession was
obtained through coercion and Appellant's ignorance of his fundamental rights.
The Appellant could not speak or understand English. (R. 156 p. 2011. 1-2).
The translation by Trooper Davis as the interpreter is problematic. (R. 65 para
3) Appellant Juarez's question regarding the purpose of a lawyer (R. 156 p. 101
11. 13-18, 22-24) is liable to judicial inquiry. The State has produced no
evidence, other than the statements of the interrogating officers, that Appellant
understood and waived the rights afforded him under Miranda, the Fifth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the
Constitution of the State of Utah. In spite of the fact that they had recording
equipment available to them at all times it was never used until the Appellant
started telling them what they wanted to hear. A reasonable person doing
translations, who admits to less than 100% fluency in the foreign language he is
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conlession involuntary. Involuntary admissions and eon legions violate the

Miranda requirements and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and
the Constitution of the State of Utah. The burden is on the State to show that
evidence obtained following illegal police conduct is attenuated from the
illegality.
The State may assert that the statements made by the defendant following
his arrest was not the product of constitutionally violative procedures. The Utah
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of incriminating statements in light of the
Fifth Amendment and the Miranda requirements. Specifically, that Court held:
* * *

The Fifth Amendment "protects individuals from being
compelled to give evidence against themselves.... Although the
United States Supreme Court... adopted the prophylactic
Miranda warnings to preserve and reinforce the Fifth
Amendment rights of individuals in certain custodial
circumstances, those warnings are not themselves
constitutionally secured, and a violation of the . . . Fifth
Amendment may be found irrespective of whether Miranda was
breached."
* * *

State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, (865 Utah 1998), quoting State v.
Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1995); see also Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1(1985).
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ADDENDUM
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CONSTITUTION O F U T A H

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden
Issuance of warrant]
The right of the people to be secure in thejr persons houses, papers and effects against "treasonable
s S e s and seizures shall not be violated: and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
ta**
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to oe
seized.

AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be. searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro*
cess of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended:
Section 77-7-15
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing
or is attempted to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address
and explanation of his actions.
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Case No. 961600052

)

JUDGE K.L. McIFF

v.
MANUEL DOMINGUEZ JUAREZ,
Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

v.

]

ANGEL D. RASCON,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 961600051
JUDGE K.L. McIFF

Defendant.

)

This matter came before the Court pursuant to Defendants'
jointly considered motions to suppress on December 20, 1996.
Prior to the hearing, the parties had submitted memoranda of
points and authorities.

The facts in support of the motions, and

the facts in opposition to the motions, had been set forth in the
parties' memoranda, with citations to the transcript of the
preliminary hearing.

The Court reviewed the parties' memoranda

prior to the hearing, and at the hearing, entered the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On April 20, 1996, Kane County Deputy Dan Watson was on

duty and was traveling eastbound on U.S. Highway 89 in Kane
County.

He stopped the driver of a westbound pickup truck for

exceeding the posted speed limit, 68 miles per hour in a 55 mile
per hour zone.
2.
truck.

Mr. Juarez was the registered owner and driver of the
Mr. Rascon was a passenger.

The truck was also occupied

by Mr. Juarez's adult daughter and her infant child.
3.

Neither Mr. Juarez nor Mr. Rascon could speak English

well, so Ms. Juarez interpreted the communications between them
ana Deputy Watson at the scene of the stop.
4.

Deputy Watson obtained Mr. Juarez's driver license and

vehicle registration, and returned to his vehicle to verify the
documents through Kane County Dispatch.
5.

While waiting for the dispatcher's response, Deputy

Watson took his certified narcotics detector dog, Rudi, out of
his venicle.

He had no particular reason to take Rudi out, but

toe: Rudi near Defendants' vehicle and commanded her to sniff.
Dep-cy Watson did not ask Defendants' consent, but informed them

of his intentions.

Deputy Watson's use of Rudi was consistent

with his practice in approximately 70% of his traffic stops,
where he, as a matter of routine practice, takes Rudi out of his
vehicle and wal-ks her around the stopped vehicle.

What he did in

this case was consistent with his general practice, and was not
something specifically directed to Mr. Juarez's truck to the
exclusion of others.
6.

Rudi indicated on the driver's side seam of the truck's

tailgate.

Deputy Watson put Rudi back into his vehicle.

Deputy

Watson then asked Mr. Juarez, who could not speak English, out of
Mr. Juarez's truck.
the rear of

Deputy Watson and Mr. Juarez proceeded to

Mr. Juarez's truck, out of earshot of Ms. Juarez,

who could speak and understand English.

Deputy Watson then asked

Mr. Juarez why Rudi was indicating on the truck.
7.

Mr. Juarez opened the tailgate and pulled a suitcase to

the back of the tailgate.

When he did so, Deputy Watson noticed

that double stick tape was used to hold the bed liner to the
truck bed, and that the bed liner had pulled away from the truck
bed on the driver's side at the rear.
8.

Deputy Watson pulled the bed liner slightly away from

the truck bed at that spot and used a flashlight to observe
packages that appeared to be wrapped in tape.
9.

Mr. Juarez threw his hands up and stated in broken

English, "Its not my pickup."

10.

Deputy Watson called dispatch and requested backup,

then examined the space between the bed liner and the truck bed
on the passenger's side of the truck, where he observed similarly
wrapped packages.
11.

Utah Highway Patrol Trooper John Davis, who spoke

Spanish, arrived at the scene and placed Mr. Juarez in the back
of his patrol vehicle.
12.

Both officers removed Mr. Rascon from the passenger

side of the truck and handcuffed him.

They then removed Ms.

Juarez and the infant from the truck and handcuffed her.
13.

Kane County Chief Deputy Allen Johnson arrived at the

scene and the three adults, the child, and Defendants' truck were
taken to the Kane County Jail.
14.

In the jail parking lot, the bed liner was removed and

31 packages, weighing a total of 67.31 pounds of what was later
determined to be marijuana, were removed from the space between
the bed liner and the bed of the truck.
15.

At the jail, the three adults were interviewed

separately interviewed by the officers.

Trooper Davis

interpreted during the interviews of Mr. Juarez and Mr. Rascon.
16.

At the scene and at the beginning of the interviews at

the jail, the three adults were each given the Miranda warning.
2ach agreed to speak to the officers, and each initially denied
any knowledge of the marijuana.

17.

The officers interviewed one of the adults, then the

next, then the next.

Although there were recesses in each

adult's interview as the officers moved from one adult to the
next, the interviews were continuing interrogations, not
subsequent interrogations.

The combined interviews lasted

approximately two to two and one-half hours.
18.

The interviews resulted in differing explanations

regarding the ownership of the truck, the purpose of the trip,
and whether Mr. Juarez had been in Utah before.

Mr. Juarez

denied having crossed the United States border or ever having
been stopped in a vehicle where marijuana was located.

That

information was inconsistent with independent information which
the officers obtained through law enforcement channels.
19.

When the officers came back to visit with Mr. Juarez

the final time, they advised him that they were going to have to
hold all three adults for further investigation.

Until then, Mr.

Juarez had denied any responsibility for the marijuana.

The

officers told Mr. Juarez that they thought he could supply the
information as to who was involved, but that in the absence of
that information, they would have to hold all three adults.
20.

The officers advised Mr. Juarez, as well as Ms. Juarez,

that Ms. Juarez would be separated from her child, and the child
would be placed in temporary foster care until somebody could
come back and pick the child up.

Mr. Juarez initially testified

that the officers had told him that his daughter would not see

her child again.

However, he later acknowledged that the

officers had told him that although his daughter and grandchild
would be separated, no time frame for the separation was
indicated.
21.

Ms. Juarez also gave conflicting testimony regarding

the separation from her child.

On direct examination, she stated

that she thought foster care meant for a long time, but in crossexamination, she acknowledged that the officers had told her that
the child would be kept only until arrangements could be made for
someone for come and get it.
22.

Although Ms. Juarez is not a United States citizen, she

had lived in Chandler, Arizona for approximately

12 years and

had attended grades 1 through 10 in the public school system in
Chandler, Arizona.

She had therefore been raised in and exposed

to a society which would not allow a child to be summarily
permanently taken from its parents.
23.

The officers did not threaten to take the child away

permanently or even for a long time, but rather only until
arrangements could be made for someone to pick it up.
24.

After Mr. Juarez was advised that all three adults

would be held pending further investigation, and that foster care
WOU— H

be arranged for his grandchild, Deputy Watson left that

rocm in order to advise Ms. Juarez that she would be booked.
25.

At that time, Deputy Watson took the baby from Ms.

Jua.ez to the dispatching area.

Because of the tender age of the

child, it was necessary to make temporary foster care
arrangements in order to be able to hold the mother in custody.
It was appropriate to advise each of the three adults as to what
was transpiring.
26.

Whether Mr. Juarez saw Deputy Watson carry the child

past the room in which he was being interviewed was not clear
from the record.

Even if he did, that event was simply what the

officers had told him would"happen because the child could not
remain in the jail with its mother.
27.

Mr. Juarez agreed to speak with officers, and confessed

that he had agreed to transport the marijuana for the sum of
$3,000.

He advised that Mr. Rascon had helped him load it, but

was not to share in the profit.

He assured the officers that his

daughter was not involved.
28.

Based on Mr. Juarez's statements, Mr. Juarez and Mr.

Rascon were held, but his daughter and grandchild were released.
29.

Mr. Juarez's decision to tell the truth was not the

product of threats, but rather the product of his desire to avoid
having his daughter being held in jail and separated from her
child, even temporarily, for something she did not do, but that
he did.

The foundation for him telling the truth was his

decision to accept the responsibility, which was rightfully his,
rather than have his daughter suffer any adverse consequences.
His confession was based on guilt and was reliable.

\

30.

During the second portion of the interview with Mr.

Juarez, he had asked the officers what the purpose of a lawyer
was.

Trooper Davis told Mr. Juarez that lawyers explain the

client's rights, tell the client what the laws are, what the
client needs to do, and what the client can and can't do,
relating to the situation in which the client finds himself.
31.

Ms. Juarez and her child were released from jail

without being charged.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The initial stop of Mr. Juarez's truck was a legitimate

stop for speeding.
2.

It was reasonable for Deputy Watson to ask for

identification from the three adults, all of whom were of Spanish
extraction and two of whom did not speak English.
3.

It was not unreasonable for Deputy Watson to have Rudi

around the outside of the truck.
4.

Rudi's walk around the truck was not a search of the

truck and did not violate the Defendants' Fourth Amendment
rights.
5.

After Rudi indicated on the rear of the truck, it was

reasonable for Deputy Watson to look and inquire further, before
se::j.i:,g the Defendants on their way.

\

6.

The cursory examination of the bed liner was a

reasonable extension of Deputy Watson's investigation, given that
which had preceded it.
7.

When -Deputy Watson saw the taped brick-like packages,

he was justified in continuing the search at the scene and beyond
-- which resulted in discovery of the multiple brick-like
packages weighing approximately 67 pounds.
8.

It would have been unreasonable for Deputy Watson to

let the Defendants go during the progress of his investigation.
9.

After the packages were located, Deputy Watson was

justified in arresting all three adults.
10.

Although the timing of Mr. Juarez's confession suggests

that he was influenced by the announced intent to hold his
daughter pending further investigation, and the knowledge that
she would be temporarily separated from her child, that knowledge
does not mean that his confession was not voluntary.
11.

Each of the adults understood and voluntarily waived

their Miranda rights.
12.

Mr. Juarez's question about the purpose of a lawyer was

insufficient to require officers to stop the interview.
13.

Mr. Juarez's confession was voluntary.

XK
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DATED this ( [

^
day of August, 1997
BY THE COURT:

K.L.
District
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 30th day of July, 1997, I served a
true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84771

(via first class mail)

Harold J. Dent
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84771

(via first class mail)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the //
day of'-JU^ust, 1997, I served a
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84771

(via first class mail)

Harold J. Dent
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84771

(via first class mail)
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4 696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801-) 644-5278
Facsimile: (801) 644-2281

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
)

ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

)

Case No. 961600052

)

JUDGE K.L. McIFF

Plaintiff,
v.
MANUEL DOMINGUEZ JUAREZ,
Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

ANGEL D. RASCON,

)

Case No. 961600051
JUDGE K.L. McIFF
Defendant.

)

This matter came before the Court pursuant to Defendants'
jointly considered motions to suppress on December 20, 1996.
Prior co the hearing, the parties had submitted memoranda of
points and authorities.

The facts in support of the motions, and

the facts in opposition to the motions, had been set forth in the
parties' memoranda, with citations to the transcript of the
preliminary hearing.

The Court reviewed the parties" memoranda

prior to the hearing, and based thereon, entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that Defendants' motions to suppress the evidence are
denied.

DATED this [ / day of Mayr 1997.

BY THE COURT:

A
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I certify that on the 30th day of April, 1997, I served a
true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION
TO SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84771

(via first class mail)

Harold J. Dent
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84771

(via first class mail)

Cathy Johnstone
P.O. Box 96
Kanab, Utah 84741

(via first class mail)

un^u h^^hj-yfcyCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the //** day ofd&f, 1997, I served a true
and correct signed copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84771

(via first class mail)

Harold J. Dent
P.O. Box 160
St. George, Utah 84771

(via first class mail)

Cathy Johnstone
P.O. Box 96
Kanab, Utah 84741

(via first class mail)
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7 6 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 847.41
Telephone: (435) 644-5278
Facsimile: (435) 644-2096
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No.

961600052

MANUEL JUAREZ,
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for sentencing on May 14,
1999.

The State of Utah was represented by the Deputy Kane

County Attorney, J. Christian Rasmussen.

The Defendant was

present and was represented by counsel, Jim R. Scarth.

The Court

had previously ordered that a pre-sentence investigation report
be prepared by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and
the report was received and reviewed by the parties and counsel

STATE OF UTAH v. MANUEL JUAREZ
CASE MO. 961600052

A

prior to sentencing.

The parties made sentencing

recommendations.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

SENTENCE.

On Count 1, Possession of a Controlled

Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony,
Defendant is sentenced and ordered to serve 0 to 5 years in the
Utah State Prison, and pay a fine and surcharge in the total
amount of $9,250.

The term of imprisonment is suspended.

The

fine and surcharge imposed are suspended except for a total of
$2,500.
2.

ORDER OF PROBATION.

Defendant is placed on

unsupervised probation for a period of 36 months, subject to the
following terms and conditions:
a. Defendant shall serve one year in the Kane County Jail.
b. Defendant shall pay at least $100 per month toward the
fine and surcharge imposed.

The first payment shall be

due 30 days after Defendant's release from the Kane
County Jail, and subsequent payments shall be due on or
before the 1st day of each month thereafter until all of
the unsuspended portion of the fine and surcharge has
been paid in full.
STATE OF UTAH V. MANUEL JUAREZ
CASE NO. 961600052

Payments shall be made to the Clerk

of the Sixth Judicial District Court, 7 6 North Main
Street, Kanab, Utah 84741.
c. Defendant shall not use, possess, or have control of
illegal controlled substances.
d. Defendant shall provide a sample of his breath or bodily
fluids, upon the request of any law enforcement officer.
e. Defendant shall submit to a search of his person,
residence, vehicle, and other premises under his control,
upon the request of any law enforcement officer upon
reasonable suspicion, without the necessity of a warrant.
f. Defendant shall maintain full-time employment, full-time
education, or a full-time combination of both.
g. Defendant shall not commit any further violation of law.
h. Defendant shall notify the Court if he is arrested for
any reason.
i. Defendant shall notify the Court of any changes in his
address.
3.

CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.

Defendant need not

serve any portion of the term of incarceration until after his
penaing appeal is resolved,
4.

RIGHT OF APPEAL.

Defendant has 30 days from date

hereof m which to move to appeal the sentence of the Court.
STATU ZF
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DATED this

day of June, 1999.

BY THE COURT:

District Court Judg

STATE OF UTAH v. MANUEL JUAREZ
CASE NO. 961600052

.4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 18th day of May 1999, I served a true
and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P. 0. Box 160
St. George, UT 84770

(via first class mail)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the /J^*
day of June, 1999, I served a
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND
SENTENCE to each person or entity listed below:
Jim R. Scarth
P. 0. Box 160
St. George, UT 84770

(via first class mail]

Kane County Sheriff
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741

(via hand delivery)

Utah Highway Patrol
126 East 100 South
Kanab, UT 84741

(via first class mail)
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